expertise, had easy access to the mining industry because so few individuals or families, given the risks and costs, could establish permanent dynasties 1 . The upward trend of the silver industry can best be seen in the production curve (see Figure I ). In addition to plotting the yearly output of all the camps from 1700 to 18101 have noted briefly the possible causes of important peaks and dips and I have calculated and shown a trend line 2 . Another graph contains the yearly output of Zacatecas from 1700 to 1810 and of Guanajuato from 1766 to 1810. It is obvious that while Mexico's output could fluctuate sharply from year to year, its overall performance was strongly upward. The trend line indicates that colonial production rose by 1.39% each year after 1700. A close look at the peaks above the trend line indicates some impressive annual gains in both the first half and the second half of the 18th century. This is not the picture of an industry growing healthy suddenly after 1760 but rather steadily from the beginning of the century. It is also obvious that the colony's 18th-century boom did not depend on the continuing prosperity of the two largest camps, Zacatecas and Guanajuato, whose mines were badly inundated during the second and third quarters 3 . The question always arises, whether under a more enlightened mining policy than was favored by the 18th-century Spanish Bourbons the colonial silver industry would have made even greater gains. Alexander von Humboldt, the German engineer-scientist who traveled extensively in Mexico during the early 1800's, advocated eliminating as many taxes and regulations as possible to stimulate production even further 4 . The Crown had consistently rejected such advice. To eliminate the taxes and monopolies associated with the silver industry would have sharply reduced the Crown's revenue; but perhaps more importantly such far-reaching reforms may not have been considered as necessary because of the steady rise in silver proproduction 5 .
The statistics show how strong and resilient the industry was. The total from 1700 to 1821 was about 170,000,000 marks for an annual average yield of 1.4 million marks 6 . In the first five years of the 18th century Mexico's mines produced an average 572,403 marks a year; in the last five years before Hidalgo's Revolt (1810) they produced 2,706,337 marks for a 374.0 % increase 7 . After 1810 colonial production fell sharply. In part this was atttributable to the closing of some large, important mines, like Valenciana in Guanajuato; but less accurate and complete records after 1810 may also account for the decline 8 . Still a comparison of production in 1700-1704 and 1815-1819 shows an increase of 85.5%. In 17 of the 23 quinquinnea colonial output was higher and in only six was it lower. The biggest jump (31.5%) occurred in 1770-1774 because of the simultaneous recovery of Zacatecas and Guanajuato. Before Hidalgo's Revolt the biggest loss (13.4%) was recorded in 1800-1804 when mercury was in short supply and after Hidalgo's Revolt the biggest loss (61.8%) was posted in 1810-1814 when the insurgents succeeded in closing down important mines in Guanajuato and then Zacatecas. In the first fifty years of the 18th century production rose threefold compared to a twofold increase in the last fifty years. In 1721 production passed for the first time ever the million-mark level; in 1750 it reached 1.5 million, in 1772 2.0 million and in 1779 2.9 million; finally in 1804 it surpassed the three-million-mark level. As indicated on Figure I , these milestones can be identified with discoveries or res ) For a further discussion of the revenues and operations of Zacatecas' real caja and the Bourbons' financial reforms, see Richard L. Garner, Reformas borbónicas y operaciones hacendarías: la real caja de Zacatecas, 1750 -1821 , Historia mexicana, num. 108 (avril-junio, 1978 ) See footnote 2 for sources. 7 ) A five-year average, although it may distort the actual state of the mining industry on a year-to-year basis, does provide a better gauge for comparing the performance of the silver industry over the long term than choosing the first and the last year because those years may be highly unusual. 8 ) Silver data in general are less reliable for the period 1810-1821 than earlier periods. If the real caja of Zacatecas is typical of other subtreasuries, the procedures became sloppy and the officials careless during the war years. For a brief but enlightening discussion of what happened in Guanajuato see Doris M. Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at Independence, 1780 -1826 , Austin, Texas 1976 . It is not clear from her analysis why the Guanajuato investors had less confidence in the future and therefore were morc reluctant to recover the mines than the Zacatecas investors.
9 ) Β r a d i η g, Miners and Merchants, chapter 4. Also Humboldt presents useful surveys of all the mining camps in Political Essay, III. coveries of mines in Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Bolaños, Taxco, Sombrerete, Real Monte and San Luis Potosí 9 . A downturn in production could have many causes. There was always the risk that cave-ins, new flooding, inept management or uneconomical grades of ore could lead to a cessation or reduction in operations at a particular mine or even a group of mines. But when the downturn was particularly sharp or continuous, then external factors beyond the control of the owners was affecting the whole industry. Two such recurrent factors were shortages in the supply of mercury and labor. Mercury, an essential ingredient in refining the ore, was mined in and shipped from Spain, except for small quantities from Huancavelica in Peru, and later from Austria 10 . The two worst mercury shortages were in 1759-1761 and 1799-1801. In the first mercury was in such short supply that the existing stock in the mining camps had to be redistributed on the basis of where it was most needed 11 . In the second, the result of the British blockade of the Spanish mainland, the colony's supply was almost completely exhausted 12 . In the five-year period from 1760-1764 output fell 12.2 % and in the five-year period from 1800-1804 it dropped 135%. Without mercury refineries had to curtail their operations or stop them altogether and thisof course led to the closing of many mines. Epidemics, famines and other similar disasters, which were frequent in the 18th century as pressure on the colony's limited agricultural capacity mounted, could have a pronounced effect on the silver industry by creating a shortage of labor. The worst agricultural and demographic disasters were 1736-1738, 1762-1764, 1779-1781, 1784-1786, 1795-1797 and 1805-1807 13 . Epidemics and famines did not strike all the camps at the same time but they generally showed up within a year or two before running their course. Illness rather than death caused the mines and refineries, which were still highly labor-intensive operations, to curtail their operations. Also the loss of feeds for animals could curtail output. On the other hand, the existence of a large, mobile labor pool, especially in the 10 ) Zacatecas' real caja kept separate accounts for mercury shipped from Spain, Peru (in the 1750's and 1760's) and Austria (1790's and 1800's).
11 ) Clements Library, University of Michigan (hereafter CLUM), Zacatecas Collection (hereafter Zac), Treasury Records and Correspondence (hereafter TRC), 1760-1769, Box E. According to a letter from Joseph González de Velasco in Mexico City, 2 January 1760, great care should be exercised in distributing the mercury (3,729 quintales sufficient to produce about 300,000 to 400,000 marks) because no more could be expected from Peru or Spain in the near future. I2 ) Archivo General· de la Nación (hereafter AGN, Historia, legajo 49, expediente 26. Also Β r a d i η g, Miners and Merchants, 205. 1') Donald Cooper, Epidemic Disease in Mexico City, 1761-1813: An Administrative, Social and Medical History, Austin, Texas 1965. northern mining camps, helped to limit the impact of such crises on labor supplies 14 .
When the creole jurist, Francisco Javier Gamboa published "Comentarios de las ordenanzas de minas" in 1761, he offered not only a discussion of the law but also an analysis of the industry, which has greatly influenced later studies. He found that a number of camps like Zacatecas were old, expensive to operate and in need of capital to repair and expand the shafts and tunnels. Gamboa's solution was a merchant-miner guild through which mercantile capital could be channeled to restore mines and camps requiring heavy investment. In short, as Brading points out, the plan was designed to extend and legitimate the financial control of the merchant community (which Gamboa served as solicitor) over the mining industry. The plan was not implemented because of the fear that it would give the merchants too much power and influence 15 . Figure I reveals that production began to slacken in the late 1750's and finally bottomed out in the early 1760's. Part of the explanation for this may be attributed to a shortage of capital, or perhaps more accurately the maldistribution of capital in an economy which lacked modern credit and banking institutions. The question is, would output have fallen as far as it did in the early 1760's without first a scarcity of mercury and then an epidemic? Moreover, is it not evident from Figure I , that silver production began to climb once the epidemic had abated? It is significant that during the 1760's new, expensive undertakings (some successful, some not) can be documented in Zacatecas, Fresnillo, Real del Monte, Pachuca and Guanajuato. Substantial losses, perhaps totalling millions of pesos, do not suggest a lack of capital as much as a lack of 14 ) I have tried to trace the movement of people in the area of Zacatecas but with little success. There is no doubt that the population of the northern mining camps fluctuated with the changes in the output of the mines. In 1803, for example, the intendant of Zacatecas declared that the decline in production caused by the recent mercury shortage had led to a substantial decrease in the local work force. Francisco R e η d 6 η, La Provincia de Zacatecas en 1803, Memoria de la Academia Nacional de Historia y Geografia, VI (1955), 10.
Brading, Miners and Merchants, 149-152; Francisco Javier Gamboa, Comentarios de las ordenanzas de minas, México 1761, 160-172. It may of course have served G a m b o a's cause to have emphasized so strongly the need for capital since the merchants, who lived in the camps and represented the Consulado of Mexico City, had long provided avios and loans to Mexico's miners, and would obviously gain under the plan that Gamboa put forward. A document on mercury prices, prepared by Gamboa nearly a dozen years later and submitted to Viceroy Antonio Bucateli, continued to stress a need for capital to construct shafts and tunnels even though capital appeared to be flowing into Zacatecas and other camps in substantia] sums. Latin American Collection, Yale University (hereafter LAY) Box 6, Item E.
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700,000 600,000 500,000 400 000^"" """ """ "' ι ι I j ι ι ι I ι ,e ) Actually when Zacatecas began its recovery in the 1760's, it did so with a smaller amount of capital (perhaps a few hundred thousand pesos compared to the many hundreds of thousands οΐ pesos spent in the previous 30 years) but a larger array of talent in the name of Borda, the Anza brothers and Rétegui.
17 ) It appears that the major reforms followed rather than preceded the strong upsurge in production of silver during the late third and early fourth quarters. It is immediately obvious from Figure I that Zacatecas' production curve in contrast to Mexico's consisted of two rather distinct cycles. Output rose from about 150,000 marks in the first decade of the 18th century to over 250,000 marks in the middle of the 1720's and then it declined for the next 30 years, reaching its nadir in 1763. The next cycle, beginning in the 1760's, peaked in the late 1770's, fell back and leveled off in the 1780's and 1/790's and finally reached new highs in the early 1800's before a slow decline set in during the independence movement. Zacatecas' cyclical pattern was probably characteristic of other mining camps, but, as noted earlier, the temporary loss of one or two major camps had a less adverse effect on Mexico's silver registrations in the 18th century than may have been the case in the century before. Zacatecas' total output from 1700 to 1821 was approximately 31,000,000 marks or 18.2 % of the colony's production. In the first quarter of the 18th century and perhaps again in the first quarter of the 19th century Zacatecas accounted for 20-25 % of all Mexico's silver; in between those periods Zacatecas' share dropped to 10-15%. Between 1700-1704 and 1805-1809 Zacatecas' output rose from an annual average of 136,046 marks to 499,224 marks for a growth of 266.7 % (compared to 374.0 % for Mexico) and a comparison of 1700-1704 and 1815-1819 shows agrowth of only 99.5 % (Mexico's growth was 85.5%). A sign of Zacatecas' depressed industry was that its quinquennial gains and losses were just about equal, 12 to 11 respectively. In 1800-1804 Zacatecas' production rose 81.5%, a record; twice in the middle period of the 18th century Zacatecas registered substantial losses of 26.9% (1740-1744) and 26.3% (1760-1764). The first was attributable to an epidemic in the late 1730's, a feud over mining rights and flooding; the second to continued flooding and the aforementioned mercury and labor shortages. If Zacatecas' midcentury depression was more severe and prolonged than most, its recovery in the late third and early fourth quarters was also more spectacular with production increasing 5.1 % in 1765-1769,45.9% in 1770-1774 and 70.9% in 1775-1779 18 .
Production statistics do not tell the whole story about Zacatecas' silver industry. The mid-century depression was long and at times severe and yet, as costly and risky an investment that mining had become in Zacatecas, it continued to attrack capital and, more importantly, miners. The constant influx and turnover in miners and investors were viewed by some as a sign of the weakness of the industry 19 . There may have been a positive aspect to all this entrepreneurial activity, however. At no time during the late colonial era did mining dynasties develop to such an extent that they could control access to mining. Frequent feuds erupted over ownership and jurisdiction, particularly in connection with the denuncias whereby an individual could claim an unworked mine or one with a few workers without making any payment. But while these feuds could lead to hard feelings and difficult lawsuits and even to a temporary dislocation in the production cycle, they did not create any insurmountable barriers to the inflow of capital and miners to late colonial Zacatecas. In addition to denuncias, many of which never resulted in feuds, there were numerous transfers of mining properties by sales and inheritances. The prices of mining properties ranged from a few pesos to tens of thousands of pesos 10 . It was not uncommon, though, for newcomers to buy abandoned mines and even abandoned refineries for purpose of restoring them. How many mining properties were bequeathed is 18 ) CLUM, Zac-Quinto y Diezmo (hereafter Q y D), 1700-1714, 1716-1729, 1734, 1738-1749, 1763-1767 ; CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1715; CLUM, Zac-Cargo y Data (hereafter C y D), 1730-1734, 1736-1737, 1750-1762, 1769, 1771-1772, 1774, 1776-1778, 1780-1782, 1784-1787, 1790-1793, 1799, 1801-1821 ; and Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Guanajuato, legajos477, 478, 480, 482. 19 ) Two 18th-century miners, Juan Lucas La s sag a and Joaquín Velás-que ζ de Léon, in their Representación que a nombre de la minería de la Nueva España, México 1774, 4-7, complained of the loss of capital and expertise because of the sons' preferences not to pursue family mining businesses. The fact is that in Zacatecas (and even in Guanajuato) only a half-dozen sons on their own or through their managers succeeded in maintaining or expanding the family business. See also Β r a di η g, Miners and Merchants, 292-295. ») CLUM, Zac-Alcabalas, 1760-1821.
not known but in only a few cases did the heirs succeed in maintaining or expanding the businesses which they inherited. As a consequence many inherited properties ended up with new owners through sales and denuncias.
The best way to illustrate the structure and function of entrepeneurship is to examine Zacatecas' 18th-century entrepreneurs themselves 21 .
Around 1700 a new set of miners and refiners, several of whom would become major entrepreneurs, entered Zacatecan mining. Up to that time the camp's most successful miners were Bartolomé Bravo de Acuña, whom Β a k e w e 11 called Zacatecas' most enterprising 17th-century miner, and his son, Juan Bravo de Medrano, later the Conde de Santa Rosa 22 . But flooding had overtaken most of Santa Rosa's mines and because of his precarious financial state, a Spaniard, Petro de Salazar, was put in charge of his operations 13 . When Santa Rosa died in 1710, despite some progress, he owed hundreds of thousands of pesos to a half-dozen different parties, an amount which far exceeded the value of his mining business. His estate passed to his son, Felipe, who lacked the skill, interest and capital to recover the mines. By 1720 the Bravo family mining business lay in ruins 24 . After Santa Rosa's death Salazar, in behalf of the Bravo's chief creditor, Nicolás Landa de López, devised a plan for the restoration of an important tiro (main shaft) in Veta Grande, a complex of badly flooded mines several miles from Zacatecas. The plan called for all the mine owners who used the tiro called Gajueles to reach their mines to pay one-seventh of their refined silver to repair and maintain the tiro. Such financial cooperation was rare in mining camps and yet Salazar accomplished it. Salazar died before the plan was fully operational but his effort led to the restoration of a half-dozen important mines associated with Gajueles and some beyond and a boost in the production curve of Zacatecas and the colony as a whole. Of the five top producers in the first quarter of the 18th century (see Figure V ) two, Joseph de Urquiola and Francisco Múñoz de Villalón, both peninsulares who immigrated to Zacatecas, operated profitable mines within this complex. By 1724, however, a feud erupted between Múñoz de Villalón, now the owner of Gajueles, and the other owners, who refused to raise their con-21 ) Only the most important miners can be examined in this essay. More than 800 persons registered silver in Zacatecas between 1700 and 1821. Most of them made small registrations and were active for fewer than five years. To study the entrepreneurial structure on a five-or ten-year cycle instead of a 25-ycar cycle, as I have done in this essay, demonstrates an even more rapid turnover. tribution. Muñoz de Villalón stopped the miners from using his tiro, although he continued to operate his mine for another decade 25 . But the result for Zacatecas in general and Veta Grande in particular was calamitous. As Veta Grande's mines filled with water again, the task of restoring and repairing them became more expensive and difficult 1 *. The success at Veta Grande from 1715 to 1725 not only helped to lure other miners and investors but also demonstrated the need to attack Zacatecas' problems in terms of clusters of mines. During the remainder of the 18th century and in the first quarter of the 19th century Zacatecas' successful silver enterprises, whether a single or joint proprietorship, became larger and more complex. The restoration of a single mine to a profitable level was increasingly harder because its flooding was usually interrelated with that of adjacent mines. The law prohibited a miner from owning and exploiting a string of mines and yet the mining surveys made in the first half of the 18th century before the law was changed indicated that such ownership was not uncommon 17 . The top producer in the second quarter was Juan Alonso Díaz de la Campa, who entered Zacatecan mining about 1720. He registered 17.3 %of all the silver between 1725 and 1750, the highest of any producer in the 18th century. At the height of his career, which covered nearly 50 years, his mining business was one of the half-dozen largest ever organized in Zacatecas. He was the recognized owner in the 1740's of the following mines: Santa Clara, Bentillas, Marcias de Arguello, Guadalupe, Santa Ana de Rayas, Esparanza, Vizcaynos. In 1746 alone he opened two tiros, Esparanza serving 3 or 4 mines and Guadalupe serving 5 mines. Owning three or four refineries Juan Alonso had the capacity to process his own ore and to handle additional ore purchased on discount from small miners 28 . Juan 15 ) AGI, Guadalajara, 174. î6 ) AGI, Guadalajara, 190. This was one of the most complete royal surveys ever made of the Zacatecan mining camp. î7 ) Β r a d i η g, Miners and Merchants, 131-132. The New Mining Code of 1783 increased the size of the mine from a surface rectangle of 120 by 60 yards to an underground rectangle of 200 by 100 yards. But the mining surveys made in the 1720's and 1740's show that these boundaries whether on the surface or underground, were difficult to draw and were often ignored. 2e ) AGI, Guadalajara, 190. He surely owned one of the largest operating refineries in the early 1730's. Hacienda Grande de Panuco, formerly owned by the Conde de Santa Rosa and purchased by Diaz de la Campa in the 1720's, had six molinos de a caballo (to crush) and five tahonas (to refine) and consumed 8,000 fanegas of salt a year, more than any other refiner. Salvador Vidal, Miscelánea datos de la época colonial comprendidos en los años 1578 -1810 , Zacatecas 1972 have not yet been able to determine a precise number of refineries owned by Diaz de la Campa but according to his will, prepared in 1736, he owned in addition to Panuco a refinery called Concepción, another called San Miguel and a third unnamed. Vidal, Miscelánea, 56-57.
Alonso was wealthy enough to advance money to miners and refiners, some of whom were newcomers and others well established, and to purchase a large hacienda and several ranches 29 . In the late 1730's and throughout the 1740's, when the flooding grew worse in large part because so many other miners had abandoned their operations, Juan Alonso joined forces with his son-in-law, Mateo Fernández de Estrada, first an independent refiner (rescatadof) and later a mine owner, his friend, Domingo Tagle Bracho, a rescatador, and his aviador, Tomás de Aristoarena y Lanz, to restore Quebradilla, the city's most famous mine, and several other large mines. These ventures were only partially successful, probably costing the four more than they recovered in refinable ore. How much they invested is not recorded but surely it was in the hundreds of thousands of pesos. Quebradilla alone required more than a hundred thousand pesos just to drop a new shaft 30 . Juan
Alonso's total registrations exceeded three-quarters of a million pesos (worth about six million pesos) 31 . Like most mining businesses, even the large and successful, Juan Alonso's company was not transferred, intact, to an heir but was disassembled through sales and denuncias. Several of his refineries and most of his mines turned up in the possession of producers who had entered mining in the second half of the 18 th century 32 .
Although no other miner achieved the success of Juan Alonso during the first half of the 18th century, several others deserve mention. Fernando de la Campa Cos, an uncle of Juan Alonso, married the daughter of a prominent Fresnillo rancher and apparently invested part of her fortune in Zacatecan mining at the same time that his nephew did. During the late 1720's and early 1730's Fernando's mines, which were located in Veta Grande not far from Juan Alonso's, yielded just under 300,000 marks worth several million pesos. A feud with several nearby miners caused Fernando to abandon his operations and to devote his time to a newly acquired hacienda on which was based his title, Conde de San Mateo de Valpariso 33 . Despite Fernando's 29 ) Diaz de la Campa had advanced loans for mine repairs, mercury purchases and other non-mining activities to the Bravo family, José de Rivera Bernárdez, owners of Quebradilla, just to mention a few. 3°) AGI, Guadalajara, 190. 31 ) See footnote 2. 32 ) Several of his Veta Grande mines ended up in the hands of Borda and Anza. Two of his refineries may have been purchased and enlarged by Borda. The best source for ownership of mines and refineries in the late 18th century is a donativo de guerra from 1781 in Archivo municipal de Zacatecas (hereafter AMZ) legajo 20, expediente 22. Juan Alonso had five sons and four daughters, but when the will was made in 1736 only the two daughters, Maria Teresa and Teresa Rosalia were accounted for. Vidal, Miscelánea, 56-57. So far as I could determine, none of his children or their heirs shows up later among the camp's producers. 33 ) Vidal, Miscelánea, 33, [46] [47] [56] [57] 63 ; Federico Scscosse, La portada de San Mateo, in: Anales del Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, XXIV, 65-67. achievement as a miner, his enterprise never attained the size and scope of Juan Alonso's. Another miner of some importance was Antonio Sáenz de la Escalera, the ranking producer during the third quarter when Zacatecas' total production reached its 18th-century nadir. Sáenz de la Escalera was the son-in-law of José de Rivera Bernárdez, the second Conde de Santiago de la Laguna and the author of "Descripción de Zacatecas" (1732) 34 . Rivera Bernárdez was the heir to three different mining businesses, the most productive of which was Urquiola's. But Rivera Bernárdez, despite his local fame, proved to be an inept miner. In the 1720's and the early 1730's, when he was most active, his silver registrations seldom amounted to more than a few thousand a year® 5 . At the time of his death in the late 1730's his estate was so heavily encumbered that his first son, who took up residence at a house in the country, could not afford to assume the title. In the 1740's Sáenz de la Escalera began to restore some of Rivera Bernárdez' mines which had been abandoned but not reclaimed. He was probably the city's most productive miner during the 1750's and into the 1760's and yet the costs of repairing these mines ate up most of his profits 36 . Perhaps the more important of the ranking producers in the third quarter was José de Zeballos, a Spaniard whose background is obscure but who entered Zacatecan mining in the mid-1750's. By the late 1750's he owned several large mines which he transferred in 1759 to the Guadalupe Company. He was one of a half-dozen local miners who agreed to form the company by exchanging their mines, all of which were associated with the tiro Guadalupe, once owned by Diaz de la Campa, for stock and by subscribing enough working capital to repair the tiro and drain the mines. But the timing was bad, because of first the mercury shortage and then the labor shortage in the early M ) José de Rivera Bernárdez, Descripción breve de la muy noble y leal ciudad de Zacatecas, México 1732.
'S) In addition to Urquiola's mines Rivera Bernárdez was the heir to mining properties owned by Ignacio and Pedro Rivera Bernárdez. Because his death preceded Pedro's death Rivera Bernárdez never actually inherited Rivera Bernárdez properties which consisted of at least two large mines -Cantera and Palmillas -and two refineries, Bernárdez and San Nicolás. Vidal, Miscelánea, 46, [48] [49] [50] 55, [57] [58] 63, [78] [79] AGI, Guadalajara, 190 and 243. 3Í ) The amount invested by Sáenz de la Escalera is not known, although it may have been substantial enough to place an added strain on the family's heavy debt. Certainly the output of Sáenz de la Escaleras operations in the 1750's and the 1760's even if that output yielded a 20% profit (not unheard of in the 18th century) or near 325,000 pesos, was not sufficiently high to reduce the debt in the tens of thousands of pesos and to provide the capital in the hundreds of thousands of pesos to keep the mines in operation. But, more importantly, Litigation over the family dept continued until the end of the ccntury, long after Sáenz de la Escalera had passed from the scene, and references to Sáenz de la Escalera and a new mining fortune do not appear in the extent documentation. 38 ) It is not absolutely certain that he was a peninsular, although he was described as such. Several other Zeballoses were active in the first half of the 18th century and several others were active when José was. His average annual output of 20,000 marks during the 1770's, although not the highest, was significant. See AMZ, legajo 20, expediente 22 for list of mine and refinery owners.
39 ) The controversy surrounding Gajueles is revealing not only because of the depth of the miners' hostilities toward Muñoz del Villadón's reassessments but also because of their general attitude toward their own businesses. When Pedro de Rivera, sent by the viceroy to settle the dispute, finished his investigation, he recommended a compromise that would allow operations to resume and Muñoz de Villalón to be more adequately compensated. All parties rejected the compromise with the other mine owners citing other problems such as dishonest workers, lack of security at night, depletion of the ores, insufficent capital etc. It was no longer a single issue of reviving the Salazar drainage plan. Rivera was in no position to deal with such an array of problems, most of which had troubled the camp for years, and rightly suspected that they were raised in an effort to disguise the miners' lack of interest after a half-dozen years of relatively prosperous mining in maintaining or expanding their operations. What really separated the average miner from the exceptional entrepreneur was ambition and drive, most importantly, to make money. Significantly the other owners associated with the Gajueles plan simply ceased to be active miners (Muñoz del Villalón continued for another decade), although some remained active with respect to their civic and military duties. AGI, Guadalajara, 174; AGN, Minería, legajo 1, expedientes 1 and 4. some with substantial capital lacked the skill. In 1737 a company of merchants agreed to subscribe a hundred thousand pesos to drain Quebradilla but within a year or so the company cancelled the subscription because the miners had made so little headway in repairing the mine. Thirty years later another company invested a quarter of a millions pesos with similar results" 0 .
As the cost of mining rose in the 18th century, miners and investors throughout the industry urged the Crown to come to their aid by reducing or eliminating the various royal taxes and monopolies. The suggestions ranged from a reduction of one-half in silver taxes and mercury prices to the elimination of the first and the sale of the latter at cost 41 . In 1765 Mexico's famous but then bankrupt miner, José de la Borda, presented to the Crown a memorial in which he analyzed the financial state of the mining industry and recommended a reduction in the diezmo (10 % silver tax) and the sale of mercury at cost (30 pesos per hundredweight) 42 . Even VisitorGeneral José de Gálvez could endorse Borda's recommendations when they were incorporated in a petition with regard to the restoration of Quebradilla in 1768. Specifically Borda asked that the Crown to waive the diezmo during the restoration, grant a fifty-per-cent reduction of the diezmo after the mine was in full, operation and sell mercury (and perhaps powder) at cost. The Crown agreed and Borda began work on Quebradilla in late 1768 or 1769 only to abandon it a few months later because of the lack of capital. It became immediately clear that the royal concessions, which the Crown would grant selectively to other miners in future years, could reduce operating costs but not provide the working capital on a project for which the concessions had been granted. Borda would tackle Quebradilla again but only after acquiring the capital to renovate the mine from the successful exploitation of several Veta Grande mines 43 . From the Crown's point-ofview the policy of granting such concessions was relatively safe, for while it 40) ACI, Guadalajara, 182; CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1760-1769, Box B; and Carlos de Β e r g h e s, Descripción de la Serranía de Zacatecas . . ., Mexico 1834, 19. 41 ) It is almost futile to try to determine when these suggestions were first made. Since the silver taxes and the mercury monopoly were cnactcd miners, refiners and their backers had com plained. The silver taxes, which included the diezmo, the one percent charged by the real caja, the double señoreaje and the mint fee had not been significantly altered since the late 16th οτ early 17th century. The price of mcrcury had been decreased from a high of 182 pesos per quintal. See Β r a d i η g, Miners and Merchants, 159-160 for discussion between viceroy and other officials over mercuryprice reductions in the 1740's. «) LAY, Box 141, Item 1. 43 ) CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1760-1769, Box B; AGN, Minería, legajo 115, expediente 1. Β r a d i η g covers some of the same ground in Miners and Merchants, [198] [199] [200] could mean a loss In revenue if a mine was recovered, it did not, at the same time, require any advance or investment of money by the treasury. If the mine were recovered and proved to be a bonanza, the effect on the camp was to increase mining activity in general.
The arrival of a new group of entrepreneurs rather than the special concessions granted Borda or even the first reduction in mercury prices (both in 1768) accounted for the camp's revival beginning in the late 1760's and continuing through the 1780's. From 1765 to 1780 Zacatecas' output quadrupled and from 1769 to 1780 the camp recorded eleven successive gains, ranging from 0.9% to 26.5%. Mines which had defied rehabilitation by earlier entrepreneurs were successfully restored after 1770. The persons most deeply involved were Borda, Marcelo and Pedro Anza and Zeballos in Zacatecas and Manuel Rétegui and Sebastián Unsain in Fresnillo 44 . In Figure V the ranking producers in the third quarter of the 18th century included two of the above: Zeballos with 8.1 % and Marcelo Anza with 4.3 %. In the fourth quarter, however, the enterprises founded by Borda and Anza and inherited by their sons produced just under a third of the camp's total silver. Rétegui, who moved from Fresnillo to Zacatecas in the mid-1780's, had 4.3 %, and a new mining company, Veta Grande, which was organized in the late 1780's, had 6.8 % 4S . Except the Veta Grande Company, which did include several persons who had been active in Zacatecas during the 1770's, the major producers during the last quarter of the 18th century entered the local industry in the 1760's or headed enterprises founded in the 1760's when the camp needed new blood. The mining reforms which were not fully in effect until the 1780's cannot explain the recovery of Zacatecas. What the Bordas, Anzas, Réteguis and others brought to Zacatecas was not just capital but expertise to deal with long-standing problems of flooded mines, deep shafts and abandoned operations. The amount of capital needed to launch several enterprises, not including Quebradilla of course, was surprisingly small.
The enterprises dominating Zacatecan mining from 1770 to 1790 were those founded by José de la Borda and Marcelo Anza. Borda's was the largest ever created before the formation of the mining companies; Anza's was comparable to Diaz de la Campa's. After his initial failure in recovering ) All were peninsulares with the qualification noted earlier about Zeballos. Borda and Anza had been active for several decades in Mexican mining while Retcgui and his companion, Unsain, were recent arrivals. Pedro de Anza spent a lot of time in Zacatecas but most of the silver was registered in Marcelo's name and later in Marcelo Jose's name.
45 ) The owners of the Veta Grande Company arc discussed at some length in Β r a d i η g, Miners and Merchants, [204] [205] [206] [207] Quebradilla Borda, on capitai borrowed from friends brought into production some large Veta Grande mines, which had been flooded and abandoned since the 1730's. Between 1774 and his death in 1778 Borda's mines produced 350,000 marks (worth 3,000,000 pesos) with 90% from the Veta Grande mines and 10% from Quebradilla, which Borda began working on again in 1776 4i . His son, Manuel, inherited Borda's Zacatecan mining properties and during the next decade under the direction of several able managers (since Manuel lived at a monastery in Cuemavaca) his mines and refineries more than doubled their output to 780,000 marks. In 1781 Manuel was full or part owner of a half-dozen tiros with an indeterminate number of underground tunnels and pits and a half-dozen refineries. He employed more than half of all the mine and refinery workers in Zacatecas in 1781 4 7 . The successful recovery of Quebradilla was a high point; its total output of 259,591 marks worth about 2.4 million pesos in less than eight years was the highest of any single operation in the camp's history. The record, of course, would soon be broken 48 . Although a decidedly smaller operation, consisting of several mines and a refinery and employing about 10% of the mine and refinery workers, Anza's enterprise nearly matched the output of Borda's mines and refineries in the 1770's 49 . In the 1780's, however, under the direction of the son, Marcelo José, the Anza mining business showed no growth. By the 1790's both enterprises had fallen on hard times. With Manuel's death in 1790 or 1791 the business passed to heirs who failed to keep it going. Marcelo Jose' was more preoccupied with his duties at the Miners' Guild than with his business and by the late 1790's his mines were flooded and abandoned and his debts mounting 50 . When Borda moved to Zacatecas, he understood that a combination of capital and skill was needed to overcome the flooding and to return the mines to operation. Intentionally Borda and the Anzas acquired their mines with such proximity so that the restorative work could be applied to a cluster of mines rather than individual mines. In the early 18th century Salazar had shown the advantage of draining and exploiting cooperatively the Veta Grande mines which were so vulnerable to inundation 51 . Moreover Borda believed that many miners were too inexperienced in draining Mexican mines and therefore they lost or wasted their investment before reaching the ore. With reference to Quebradilla he proposed that two sets of malacates -a system of ropes, pulleys and buckets, powered by mules, for lifting the water -would be necessary to raise the water the length of the 200-yard shaft: one for the first 100 yards and another for the next 100 yards. The last company, which tried to recover Quebradilla in the mid-1760's, had failed, despite an investment of a quarter of a million pesos, because it has tried to drain the shaft and tunnels in one, not two steps 52 . The cost of the construction of 20 malacates and the purchase of the animals to run them and the supplies for both the malacates and the animals soon consumed his funds. Royal concessions, which he was granted in 1768, did not bring a flock of investors to his door. When work on Quebradilla resumed, it ultimately proved the correctness of Borda's drainage plan 53 .
SI ) Borda's mines were in the atea of the previously discussed, early 18th century tiro, Gajueles. Two of Borda's main mines, Esparanza and San Acasio, were immediately adjacent to the Gajueles complex and when Salazar successfully drained Gajueles, he also made it possible for these two mines to be drained and restored. AGN, Guadalajara, 190 ; AMZ, legajo 20, expediente 22. 52 ) CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1760-1769, A. Much of the same material may be found in AGN, Minería, legajo IIS, expedientes 1-4. Brading quotes Borda as saying "when the water taken out by my whims is compared to theirs [the previous company] then everyone must agree that water which was insuperable for them is like a toy for me"; Miners and Merchants, [199] [200] . The royal treasury officials in Zacatecas were asked to comment on Borda's petition for a reaffirmation of the concessions (which Bucareli agreed to in 1777) and they stated that although Borda failed to restore Quebradilla the first time, he had shown in Veta Grande how talented he was at draining mines and in all likelihood he would succeed in his second attempt to recover Quebradilla. CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1760-1769, Box B, in a large packet of documents concerning the history of Borda and Quebradilla.
53 ) The financing of Borda's Zacatecan operations is still far from clear. In his petition for Quebradilla concessions he stated that the cost of the malacates was so high that no aviador would step forward to finance their construction, especially after the failure of the earlier company. But there is no evidence either that once granted any aviadores stepped forward. CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1760-1769, Box A. Brading claims that without the concessions Borda would not have "dared transfer to Zacatecas"; Miners and Merchants, 201. But even before the concessions were officially granted in 1768 he was in Zacatecas and had created a stir (along with Anza) by claiming certain abandoned mines and purchasing other mining properties. CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1760-1769, Box A. To what extent did the reduction in mercury prices contribute to Zacatecas' recovery? Β r a d i η g has cautioned against reliance on any particular explanation, although he himself stresses the Bourbon Reforms in cutting costs and stimulating investment in mining 57 . The fifty-per-cent drop in mercury prices between 1768 and 1777 could not help but contribute to the recovery in Zacatecas and throughout the colony. Depending on the price of the ore and the efficiency of the operation, the cost of refining the ore decreased from 22-23% of the value of the silver to 20-21 % s 8 .
It is significant that
M ) Their mines, to the best of my knowledge, had not been extensively worked since the comprehensive mining survey of the early 1740's. At that time the survey revealed that Esparanza had not been worked in a dozen years, and San Acasio was flooded except for the two highest planes. AGI, Guadalajara, 190. SJ ) Brading and others have argued that such a yield was capable of producing a profit in properly managed and organized operations; Brading, Miners and Merchants, 152-156. The higher the yield the lower the per unit cost. But the major cost in any mining operation was the extraction, 50% or higher. What could make a difference was the size of the lode in an area that had been successfully drained. For example, Borda may have uncovered a lode 22 yards wide in one underground chamber of Quebradilla. This could be intensively exploited without significant increases in extraction costs. CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1760-1769, Box A, se ) Esparanza was said to have a potential yield of seven-eight ounces per hundredweight and Quebradilla six-eight ounces per hundredweight. AGI, Guadalajara, 190. It was doubtful, though, that such yields were consistently achieved. 57 Brading, Miners and Merchants, 151-152, 156-158. The question is one of timing. Brading, p. 157, acknowledges the importance of the "century-long upward curve in silver production" but he still emphasizes, p. 158, the relationship between the royal reforms and the sharp rise of the 1770's. se ) Estimating costs is difficult if not impossible. Every operation had to deal with a different set of circumstances and conditions. I have drawn up the following scheme, which does not differ too significantly from Β r a d i η g's figures: Extraction 40-50 % Refining 18-24% Taxation 12% Mintage 6 % Transportation, Mise 3-4 % Total Costs 80-96% Gross Profits 20-40 % In calculating costs there is no easy way to determine what miners and refiners included and what they excluded. For example, how did they account for the costs of build-Such savings over the long term could be significant for any large mining enterprise. But the problem in Zacatecas and perhaps other camps in 1768 and later in 1777 when the reductions took effect was not so much how to use more mercury but how to extract more ore. To be sure the lower price allowed miners and refiners to amalgamate profitably a wider range of ores. But as the mercury accounts for the years between the first and second reduction in price show, the main task was to dig more ore to take advantage of lower refining costs. In 1769 Zacatecan production of plata de azogue rose 41.9 %; a year later it rose 13.2 %. The proportion of plata de azogue to plata de fuego went from three-fifths to four-fifths 59 . Detailed records of mercury purchases do not exist for 1768. We do know, however, that mercury purchases may have increased as much as 50% from 1768 to 1769. Just under half of the increase went to José de la Borda in his abortive attempt to recover Quebradilla. Although several other large producers made sizeable purchases of mercury, they may have been reacting to the improved prospects of their mining operations rather than to the new lower price. One result that may be related to the decrease of the price was that aviadores and rescatadores, who served primarily small and medium-sized operators, increased their mercury purchases because they could make larger profits on low-grade ores than before. But their share of the registered silver averaged about a third of the total. In the 1770's the success of Borda, Anza, Zeballos and Rétegui, who would probably have undertaken their ventures whether the price of mercury had changed or not, accounted for a doubling in the sale of mercury 60 . The difficulty of assessing the impact of the mercury-price reductions underscores Bucareli's assertion that the rise in ing a drainage ditch, or dropping a shaft, or repairing a tunnel or constructing malacate systems? I agree with Β r a d i η g's view that refining costs were probably more accurate than extraction costs, Miners and Merchants, 153. But a correction must be made on his own calculations of the refining costs. His discussion appears in Miners and Merchants on pages 152-156, and considers the data found in two documents, one from Zacatecas and another for Real del Monte, both from the year 1801. This was a time of shortage when some refiners had to use the higher priced Austrian mercury -62 pesos per quintal compared to 41 pesos -instead of the Castillan mercury. Austrian mercury was used in both of Β r a d ί η g's examples so that the refining costs were two to three per cent higher than normal because except in shortages refiners purchased Castilian mercury. Time and space do not permit a discussion of how this would affect Blading's analysis but let it suffice to say that a savings of two to three per cent on substantial registrations over many years would be considerable. s») CLUM, Zac-C y D, 1769. 60 ) Mercury records show how much mercury was purchased, who purchased it, how it was paid for, who the bondsmen were and how much silver was registered. The purchasers and bondsmen included miners, refiners, aviadores and merchants. For any year the major purchasers were largest miners. The most complete collection of mercury accounts may be found in CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1770 -1779 production was the consequence of new explorations and discoveries rather than changes in royal mining policies 61 . The move toward consolidation or cooperation received a boost with the implementation of the new Mining Code in 1783, Although the laws governing ownership and jurisdiction of underground tunnels were not strictly enforced, in Zacatecas at least, they still did not favor the formation of wellorganized and -financed mining companies 62 . Two companies were formed amidst considerable controversy in Zacatecas during the 1780's. The united company, called the Veta Grande Company, had acquired mines associated with the tiro Gajueles, successfully restored by Salazar in the early 18th century 63 . Who owned the mines before the Veta Grande Company is not known. In addition the company purchased several large refineries 64 . During the 1790's the company limped along, as its costs generally exceeded its revenues. Most of the original stockholders dropped out. Its principal stockholders were several wealthy investors from Mexico City; its general manager (and also a stockholder) was Ventura Arteaga, who formerly had managed Borda's enterprise. A major task facing the company was draining and maintaining shafts and tunnels that ranged from 100 to 400 yards. Perhaps as many as a dozen malacates were needed to pump out the water. Moreover a drought during the middle years of the 1790's left many of the animals used to power the malacates either ill or dead. Finally Juan de Espoldoy, the talented manager of its large Concepción mine, was jailed in 1795 because he was a French national 65 . Citing unprofitable operations, the remaining stockholders around 1800 (in the middle of the colony's worst mercury shortage) applied for concessions similar to those granted Borda earlier. The Crown agreed, although it delayed their implementation until 61 ) See Garner, Reformas borbónicas, in: Historia mexicana, núm. 108, for a discussion of this dispute.
M ) Β r a d i η g, Miners and Merchants, [131] [132] ) Concepción may hare been the centerpiece of the Veta Grande Company. In the 1740's it had 11 floors, was already 100 yards deep and was badly flooded. A halfdozen other mines, so the survey stated, could benefit if Concepción were rehabilitated, (AGI, Guadalajara, 190) . How many of these adjacent mines the company recovered is not known. See footnote 65 for source on Concepción.
•4) It is unclear whether the company purchased and remodeled existing refineries or purchased old refineries and built new ones. The evidence suggests that two of refineries -Plata, formerly San Miguel, and Sauceda -had been owned by Borda. Sauceda had earlier belonged to José Zeballos, Joseph Bolado (an aviador) and Francisco Muñoz de Vitlalón, Buen Suceso's previous owner was Manuel Flores Correa. Sauceda was the largest followed by Buen Suceso and San Miguel. AZM, legajo 20, expediente 22; AGN, Historia, legajo 49, expediente 26; AGN, Minería, legajo 115, expedientes 3 and4;CLUM, Zac-Alacabalas, 1760 and 1772; Vidal, Miscelánea, 48. 65 ) Concepción is referred to the Espoloy's disposition. AGN, Historia, legajo 503, expediente 5. the boycott had been lifted. The concessions took effect in 1802 and, according to Β ir a d i η g, the company "struck it rich" in 1804. In the first quarter of the 19th century the company's average annual output rose to 78,215 marks (up from 14,947 marks in the previous quarter) and the stockholders who stayed with the company divided up profits in the millions of pesos, several times their original investments 66 . The savings from the concessions might account for 10 to 15 % of the profits but the concessions themselves could not account for the company's bonanza unless the granting of concessions persuaded the stockholders to raise additional capital for expanding or renovating the mine. There is no direct documentation that the stockholders so acted. Perhaps the royal concessions, combined with new managers, caused the company to redouble its effort 67 . In any event the sharp rise in output of silver suggests the discovery of new, rich lode which with an abundance of mercury and lower operating cost (as a result of the concessions) helped the company to earn such high profits 68 .
The organization of the Quebradilla Company in 1803, although different in structure, was probably the largest enterprise ever created in Zacatecas. Two Basque miners, Fermín Apezechea and Bernardo Iriarte, who had immigrated to the camp in the early 1780's,had gained control of the Quebradilla mines after a prolonged dispute with the heirs of the Borda estate 69 . Unable to renovate Quebradilla with their own resources, they formed the company (based on 24 shares) to include five miners and refiners and their aviadores 70 :
66 ) Brading, Miners and Merchants, 206. 67 ) Silver was registered in the name of the company by Ventura de Arteaga, the chief administrator and a stockholder, for most of the years between 1788 and 1800. Other persons occasionally registered its silver before 1800 but after that date Arteaga's name no longer appeared in the silver ledgers. He may have retired from the company, although he continued to live in Zacatecas. The new administrator, as of 1805, according to the silver ledgers (CLUM, Zac-C y D) was Juan de Espoldoy. By 1810, though, he had probably been replaced.
e8 ) The oversupply of mercury (following the lifting of the embargo in 1801) led to a brief suspension of the silver diezmo in 1802 (overruled by the viceroy in 1803). This combined with the abundance of mercury and the renewed activity of the large mining enterprises following the embargo, helped to push silver production to a new high in 1803, (CLUM, Zac-C y D, 1803) . The suspension of the diezmo surely had the effect of encouraging many small or marginal miners to expand their operations, especially the production of inferior ores. But the evidence also shows that the major producers, like the Veta Grande Company and Manuel Rétegui, had been increasing their production since the end of the mercury shortage. From 1803 through 1807 the company's output averaged about 100,000 marks a year, an amount which barely covered the annual expenses of approximately 1,000,000 pesos. Then, in 1808 the company's owners registered as much as 350,000 marks worth about 3,000,000pesos, which, it would appear, was sufficient enough to cover the operating expenses and to recover the capital invested 73 . In the same year the company filed a petition to be granted concessions because of the heavy expense in clearing and operating the mine. It is uncertain if the petition truly reflected the company's financial condition in 1808 or if it was based on operating costs between 1803 and 1808, that is, before the record-breaking 1808 registrations. In any event, after a "voluntary contribution" of 50,000 pesos to save the monarchy, the viceroy on 5 January 1809 approved the petition, permitting the company to pay only half the diezmo and to buy mercury at cost 74 . In 1809 the company produced more silver than in 1808 with registrations of 71 ) Brading, Miners and Merchants, 204. Borda's actual investment in rehabilitating Quebradilla was 459,428 pesos, although his total costs which included construction of a new refinery were 821,545 pesos.
7Ï ) The administrator of the real aduana in Zacatecas commented that the Quebradilla Company was so vast that he found it diffìcult to monitor the highways and streets in that area for contraband, (CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1800-1809, Box A).
73 ) The precise registrations of the Quebradilla owners are difficult to determine because they were made in the name of the individual owner and not the company. These owners may have had other mining interests from which they gained silver re- 357,633 marks, and although the concessions increased the stockholders' profits, they could not account for the new record. The Quebradilla Company was probably the ranking producer in the first quarter of the 19th century as well as in Zacatecas* entire colonial history. In the first quarter the Quebradilla Company registered 39.8% of all the silver compared to 25.8% for the Veta Grande Company. But since the latter company had been operating longer, its share (5.4%) of the total registrations (see Figure  VI) was almost equal to the Quebradilla's share (5.6%). Combined these two companies registered 65.6% of all the silver in the first quarter of the 19th century and 11.0 % for the whole colonial period. Such domination by these two companies was the culmination of the 18th-century entrepreneurial pattern of creating larger and larger enterprises to counter the rising costs and the shrinking profits 75 .
Without the financial backing of the Letechipia brothers and Crespo the Quebradilla Company could not have undertaken such an enormous project. But the managerial skills of Apezechea and, to a lesser extent, of Iriarte must be recognized as contributing significantly to the project's ultimate success. The company constructed five shafts to serve the underground tunnels and operated 16 malacates to keep the shafts and tunnels drained. Eight hundred horses provided the power to turn the whims and 2,500 persons worked in the mines and refineries. Thousands of tons of ore had to be extracted from tunnels hundreds of yards underground and transported to refineries several miles away daily. When Apezechea was under consideration for DeputyGeneral of the Miners' Guild, a post which would have required him to leave Zacatecas, the stockholders objected strenously, because he was almost solely responsible for the success of the company. An inquiry revealed that he was the general administrator whose day-to-day presence was particularly crucial in keeping the shafts and tunnels clear of water. Moreover both Apezechea and Iriarte had a vast knowledge of local mining conditions and engineering problems but Iriarte's constant ill health prevented him from assisting or replacing Apezechea. Finally no one within the company possessed as much talent as Apezechea in allocating the ore to the refineries whose capacity had been stretched to their limit because of the rapid rise in output from the company's mines 76 . There is the possibility, of course, that the company's response to the government's inquiry was self-serving and yet an enterprise this large did not run itself. Somewhere in this enormous organization there had to be an Apezechea. 75 ) No evidence has yet been turned up to show how much the original stockholders earned from their Quebradilla investments or how much later stockholders paid for their stocks or earned from their investments. 76 ) CLUM, Zac-TRC, 1800-1809, Box B.
The decade after independence presents some new problems which cannot be taken up in this paper. Briefly let me state what happened. Nearly all the city's mines were closed from late 1810 until mid-1811. Damage done to Quebradilla was worse than that to any other mine and yet it was not severe enough to keep the mine closed after the insurgents had been driven out 77 . Production began to climb after 1811, reaching a level comparable to that of the 1790's (about 250,000 marks a year) but never attaining the pre-1810 level. The Quebradilla Company and the Veta Grande Company retained their dominant positions in terms of silver registrations, although both companies had a change in ownership. But the influx of miners and investors continued despite the cloudy future which resulted from the prolonged independence movement 78 .
Zacatecas, although among the oldest and richest, was only one of nearly a dozen colonial mining camps active in the 18th century. Further research will help to determine if Zacatecas was typical of the others. Most of these camps, however, required heavy capital investment to keep their mines in operation. It is generally accepted that vast sums for the recovery of old mines were raised in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The study of 18th-century Zacatecas shows that the level of capital investment grew steadily from the beginning of the 18th century and that changes in the manner of exploiting the veins and organizing the operations accompanied such growth. The culmination of this was the formation of large, complex mining companies which required managerial talent as well as engineering skill. A high level of capital investment was even maintained during Zacatecas' long, troubled depression. It may be argued that the overall health of the Mexican mining industry, as evidenced in the continual rise of the production curve, contributed to the investors' willingness to finance expensive and risky ventures in such a badly flooded camp.
In comparing the two largest camps Β r a d i η g writes that Zacatecas was more marginal than Guanajuato (and perhaps other camps) because it had to depend more heavily on "outside capital attracted in part by the exceptional fiscal concessions which the Crown offered" 79 . The significance of the distinction between raising capital locally as was done more easily after than before the discovery of Valenciana and raising it outside the camp is not immediately clear. Since the mid-17th century Zacatecan miners had 77 ) Género Garcia y Manuel Orozco y Berra, eds., Documentos histó-ricos mexicanos. México 1910 -1912 relied on local aviadores who often served as representatives for mercantile firms in other cities. Even the miners of Guanajuato did not dispense with the services of the aviadores after success at Valenciana. But, writes Β r a di η g, "Guanajuato's prosperity rested not just upon the Valenciana's mineral but also upon {a] lavish disbursement of credit and capital" to other miners and refiners 80 . Β r a d i η g also asks the obvious question: if the owners of Valenciana had not invested in local mining and refining, would not others, mainly merchants and aviadores, done so? The implication is that the owners of Valenciana, both of whom were creóles, invested in local mining out of a sense of duty or loyalty as much as, or even instead of, making a profit. Is it not possible to conclude, however, that by attracting outside capital and by winning concessions on silver taxes and mercury prices, which royal officials, private entrepreneurs and even foreign visitors regarded as onerous and therefore an impediment to economic growth and change, Zacatecas had acquired a broader and stronger financial base than Guanajuato. In the end, though, sharing similar problems, such as old, waterlogged mines, and similar prospects, such as yet untapped high-yield lobes, the two camps handled their capital financing in different but equally effective ways.
There remains a more important question. Zacatecas' two 18th-century silver booms were clearly the work of peninsulares while Guanajuato's late 18th-century silver boom, the only one for which we have ample evidence, was the accomplishment of creóles. I share Β r a d i η g's reservation that the distinction between peninsular and creole not be pushed to far 81 . Still, the question has both economic and social considerations. It is difficult to assess competence, given the evidence that is available, and yet it is hard to ignore the fact that the continual influx of Spaniards, as miners, investors or managers (as in the case of Manuel de la Borda's grand enterprise) largely accounted for Zacatecas' 18th-century booms. Not only did they have access to the necessary capital but they also possessed the foresight and skill to create and manage larger and larger enterprises. (This was true not only in mining but also in commerce and ranching.) The impact of the Bourbon Reforms was not to make it easier for the peninsulares to penetrate the Zacatecan economy but to exploit it more thoroughly and systematically than before. México 1946 México -1947 for many years the emergence of the late colonial "mining companies" made it more visible than ever. And Guanajuato was not spared this kind of anti-peninsular attitude and behavior, where the success of several creole miners led only to a short-term lapse in the peninsulares ' domination of the city's affairs. If the late colonial silver mining industry is a microcosm of society, then the economic dynamics which infused it reflect the changing character and direction of Spain's most important and valuable New World colony. For cities like Zacatecas and perhaps even Guanajuato the consequences were considerable. Their economic value and the intense struggle which it caused among peninsulares and creóles as well as between them made exploitation a way of life. The appeal of Hidalgo and the resistence to Hidalgo manifest the widening economic gap within the colonial social structure, a gap which independence itself did little to reverse 83 .
83) This Telates directly to the recent study by Lad d, The Mexican Nobility at Independence. The book offers new insights and data about Mexico's wealthy. That there was a wealthy nobility, both creole and peninsular, seems indisputable. But the book's economic analysis is so thin and incomplete as to make it largely a collection of family profiles. Ms. L a d d disagrees with Β r a d i η g's assessment that peninsulares may have been better at making money than creóles and yet she does not explicitly analyze how peninsulares and creóles invested their fortunes or operated heir businesses or whether they made money or went bankrupt. Upon reading her work, I reached an almost opposite conclusion that far from being united by title and maypmgfc ¡the wealthy nobles were litigious, competitive and antagonistic, except ovpi tjjé^mattêf that the masses shall not rule (p, 170) .
